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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                         
No. 05-4538
                         
RAYMOND SEVER,
                   Appellant
 v.
POSTMASTER GENERAL WILLIAM J.
HENDERSON; ROBERT SPAULDING, Postmaster or
OIC; JEFF RUTH, Post Office Operations Manager
                         
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 00-cv-01271)
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
                         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 13, 2006
BEFORE: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed:  April 4, 2007)
                         
OPINION
                         
PER CURIAM
Raymond Sever appeals the order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster
2General.  We will affirm the District Court’s order.
I.
Sever began working for the United States Postal Service in 1980.  On March 14,
1994, he received a letter from Honesdale Postmaster Robert Spaulding citing his failure
to follow instructions and his “willful delay of accountable mail,” and warning him that
future deficiencies might result in suspension, reduction in pay or grade, or removal. 
According to Sever’s fellow employee, David Rollison, approximately one hour after
receiving the warning letter, Sever discussed the matter with Rollison, and Sever said that
if he were dismissed from the Postal Service, he would “buy a gun and come back.” 
Sever contends that he never said this.  
On March 15, 1994, Sever held his hand in the shape of a gun, and several times
pointed his finger toward Spaulding and/or another supervisor, Edward DeGroat.  While
making these gestures, Sever made noises as if firing a gun.  While Sever admits to
gesturing, he disputes the number of times and contends that he never said “pow pow.” 
That same day, Sever was placed on “off duty, without pay” status because of the
gestures.  DeGroat says that, before Sever left the facility, Sever told DeGroat that this
was the first time in his life he felt that he could hurt someone.  On March 24, 1994,
Sever and his attorney met with Spaulding.  At the meeting, Sever’s lawyer informed
Spaulding of Sever’s treating psychiatrist’s “initial findings of Post-Traumatic Stress
symptoms,” and asked that no adverse employment decision be made until the
psychiatrist could further evaluate Sever’s condition.  Sever requested that his position be
     1  For these same actions, Sever was convicted in the Middle District of Pennsylvania
of influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a federal officer by threatening, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115.   
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held open until medical evaluation was complete, and offered to make the doctor’s
findings and reports available to postal management.  It is unclear if the defendants ever
received the medical reports. 
On April 4, 1994, the Postal Service issued a letter terminating Sever, citing
Sever’s gestures and statements referencing violence as the reason.1  At his deposition,
Spaulding testified that he was solely responsible for the decision to fire Sever, and that
he was not aware that Sever labored under any mental disability at the time that he fired
him.  After Sever was fired, he unsuccessfully pursued a discrimination complaint with
the EEOC, and was advised of his right to file a civil action.  On July 17, 2000, Sever
brought suit pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., alleging
employment discrimination due to his disability.  The District Court denied the
defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment, which argued failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, and the parties engaged in limited discovery.  Both Sever and the
defendants filed motions for summary judgment.  
In supporting his motion for summary judgment, and opposing the defense motion,
Sever relied upon two affidavits by a Dr. Boriosi, one given more than seven years and
the other more than ten years after Sever was fired.  Dr. Boriosi indicates that it was his
“initial” view that Sever had symptoms “similar to post traumatic stress disorder.”  Then,
4his further observation and analysis led him to diagnose Sever with obsessive compulsive
disorder (OCD).  Although the time frame of Boriosi’s conclusions is uncertain, it is clear
that Sever was not under Boriosi’s care until after the gesturing incident took place.  The
defendants contend that these statements by Dr. Boriosi relate only how Sever’s condition
affected him at the time of Boriosi’s affidavits (in 2001 and 2004), and that Boriosi did
not give any opinion at all as to Sever’s condition during the time leading up to his
termination.  Sever contends that Boriosi opines that Sever was suffering from OCD at
the time of his removal.   
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
denied Sever’s motion.  Sever now appeals.  
II.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary
review over the decision to grant summary judgment.  See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d
141, 145 (3d Cir. 2002).  We must determine whether the record, when viewed in the
light most favorable to Sever, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the Postmaster General was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See id.; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56. 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies only to federal employers and employers
who receive federal funding, and prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities
in matters of hiring, placement, or advancement.  See Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827,
830-31 (3d Cir. 1996).  Claims of employment discrimination in violation of the
5Rehabilitation Act are governed by the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); Shiring, 90 F.3d at 831-32.  In order to establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination, an employee must demonstrate that he or she, (1) has
a disability, (2) is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, and (3)
has suffered an adverse employment action because of his or her disability.  See Shiring,
90 F.3d at 831.  Under the ADA, a “disability” is defined as:  (A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an
individual, (B) a record of such impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).  If the employee makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer may prevail by demonstrating a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse action.  See Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160
F.3d 977, 981 (3d Cir. 1998).  
In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court
concluded that (1) Sever failed to present evidence that his alleged mental disorder
substantially limited any major life activity at the time he was fired, (2) Sever failed to
show that the defendants knew or had reason to know that he was substantially limited in
a major life activity at the time they determined that he should be fired for his threatening
conduct, and (3) the defendants did not violate the Rehabilitation Act by firing Sever for
misconduct.  Because the District Court’s third conclusion is sufficient to support
summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster General, we need not reach the question of
whether Sever has shown sufficient evidence that he was disabled at the time of the
6alleged act of discrimination.  
 Even if Sever has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Postmaster
General proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for removing him from his
position.  The Postmaster General’s evidence shows that Sever was terminated because of
his inappropriate workplace behavior, specifically, the threats of violence made against
his co-workers.  This misconduct was severe enough to result in a criminal conviction for
threatening a federal officer.  Because Sever fails to present any evidence from which a
fact finder could reasonably conclude that the stated reasons for his firing are pretextual,
the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster General. 
See Salley, 160 F.3d at 981.
Moreover, even assuming that Sever suffers from a disability, his employer may
nevertheless hold him to certain “qualification standards,” including the requirement that
an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).  Though an employer is prohibited from
discharging an employee based on his disability, the employer is not prohibited from
discharging an employee for misconduct, even if that misconduct is related to his
disability.  See Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir.
1999) (ADA was not violated when Postal Service discharged employee suffering from
schizophrenia and post traumatic stress syndrome who threatened to kill a co-worker);
Fullman v. Henderson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 688, 699 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (even assuming
employee disability, ADA was not violated when employee was discharged for filing a
7false workers’ compensation claim), aff’d, 29 Fed. Appx. 100 (3d Cir. 2002) (table). 
Accordingly, the defendants did not commit unlawful discrimination by terminating Sever
for his misconduct.  
Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
